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Out of the Mouths of Babes: Determination of
Child Custodial Preference in Illinois
Honorable J. Peter Ault *
I. INTRODUCTION
Custody determinations are among the most difficult decisions a
trial judge is called upon to make. Custody trials are always
highly-charged, emotional battles. A reality of custody cases is
that they tend to fall at opposite ends of the factual spectrum. On
one end, the cases involve competent, nurturing parents, each seek-
ing custody for unselfish reasons. In these cases, each parent is
fully capable of performing appropriate parenting skills with a
proper mixture of love, discipline, and common sense. On the
other end of this factual spectrum are cases in which neither paren-
tal alternative is adequate. In the course of these custody battles,
each parent vigorously highlights the multiple flaws of the other.
The gravity of a custody determination reveals the importance of
the judge's decision. Recognizing this gravity, both state legisla-
tures and courts have established guidelines to govern judges' con-
sideration of given factors in custody cases.
II. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
CUSTODY DETERMINATION AND CUSTODIAL
PREFERENCE
One of the most well known custody guidelines, the "best inter-
est of the child" standard, is perhaps the most difficult to define.
Although most jurisdictions use the "best interest of the child" test
to guide custodial determinations,' this standard is vague and
heavily fact-dependent. Accordingly, both statutes and case law
set forth certain (usually non-exclusive) factors that should be con-
sidered when determining the best interest of the child in custody
* Associate Judge, 10th Judicial Circuit, Tazewell County, Illinois.
1. See Cathy J. Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation Pro-
ceedings, 18 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 & nn.3, 4 (1984); e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(a)
(1989) ("The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child." (emphasis added)); Nye v. Nye, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 1952) ("The guiding
star [in matters of child custody] is, and must be at all times, the best interest of the
child.").
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Illinois followed the lead of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act ("UMDA") in providing such factors. Under the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act ("IMDMA"),4 the best
interest of the child is the primary concern in custody decisions.5
In section 602, the IMDMA sets forth seven non-exclusive factors
that "shall" be considered in determining the best interest of the
child in a given case.6
This Article focuses on the factor enumerated in section
602(a)(2) which directs the judge to consider "the wishes of the
child as to his custodian." 7 Historically, this factor has been an
important consideration in Illinois case law and its inclusion in the
statute merely codified and extended existing common law.' Com-
mon sense dictates that this factor should be considered by the trier
2. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602 (1989); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 602 historical note (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the statutory and
judicial development of Illinois custody law).
3. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987) (provid-
ing a list of five non-exclusive factog for courts to consider when making custody
determinations).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602 (1989).
5. Id. § 602(a); In re Marriage of Leopando, 435 N.E.2d 1312, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1982) ("The primary consideration before the trial court in a child custody case is
the welfare and best interests of the child."), aff'd, 449 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. 1983).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(a)(l)-(7) (1989). Section 602(a) states:
(a) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or par-
ents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child's poten-
tial custodian, whether directed against the child or directed at another person;
and
(7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.
Id.
7. Id. § 602(a)(2).
8. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(a)(2) historical note (Smith-Hurd 1980 &
Supp. 1991); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 336 N.E.2d 268, 269 (Il. App. Ct. 5th D: ;.
1975) ("[T]he feelings of the children in custody matters should ,!wys ne given serious
consideration by the court."); Rosenberger v Ec: 1 iberger, 316 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1974) (stating tht tr:a .courts always should consider children's preferences); cf
Garland 'u. G3riand, 312 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1974) ("[T]he prefer-
ences of the children are only appropriate when based on reasons related to their best
welfare.").
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of fact in appropriate cases. As one writer stated, "[iln a case
where the child has the capacity to make an enlightened judgment,
determining the child's wishes as to his custodian is a factor that
can be of particular assistance to the court in reaching its
decision."
Prior to the enactment of the IMDMA, Illinois case law recog-
nized the importance of child custodial preference. Repeatedly, Il-
linois courts held that judges should consider a child's preference
regarding custody'0 and that, if a preference existed, it should be
given "most serious consideration."" Although the trial court has
discretion regarding whether it will hear evidence of custodial pref-
erence,' 2 refusal to consider such evidence may amount to revers-
ible error.13 Further, while the preference of a child is not binding
upon the court,'4 if the minor is of sufficient maturity, 5 or if the
expression of preference is based upon factors related to the child's
best interests,'6 the court should give considerable weight to the
preference. 17
Cases decided after the enactment of the IMDMA continue to
recognize these basic tenets.' s The trial court now is mandated by
9. John M. Speca, The Role of the Child in Selecting His or Her Custodian in Divorce
Cases, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 437, 438 (1977) (providing an excellent survey of state statutes
regarding custody).
10. See, e.g., Anderson, 336 N.E.2d at 269; Finn v. Finn, 297 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1973); Swanson v. Swanson, 274 N.E.2d 465, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist.
1971); Oakes v. Oakes, 195 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1964).
11. Rosenberger, 316 N.E.2d at 3-4; Patton v. Armstrong, 307 N.E.2d 178, 178-79
(Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1974); Marcus v. Marcus, 248 N.E.2d 800, 805 (111. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1969).
12. See In re Marriage of Dall, 548 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1989);
Stuckert v. Brownlee, 486 N.E.2d 395, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985); In re Marriage
of McKeever, 453 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, para. 604 historical note (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp 1991).
13. Crownover v. Crownover, 337 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1975).
14. Patton, 307 N.E.2d at 180; cf. Stickler v. Stickler, 206 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1965) (holding that a change in the child's custodial preference is insufficient
to mandate an alteration in the custody award).
15. Dall, 548 N.E.2d at 112 (finding that if seven-year-old had unequivocally stated a
preference during the in camera interview, then that preference, while not binding, would
be entitled to consideration); In re Marriage of Kush, 435 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ill. App. Ct.
3d Dist. 1982) ("[T]he preferences of young children, though entitled to consideration,
are not binding upon the court.").
16. In re Marriage of McCune, 408 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980)
("[P]references of mature children should be given considerable weight, when they are
based on sound reasoning."); Garland v. Garland, 312 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1974).
17. Marcus v. Marcus, 248 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1969).
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Siegel, 463 N.E.2d 773, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
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statute to consider "the wishes of the child as to his custodian."' 9
Consistent with the earlier case law, however, the child's choice is
not determinative under the IMDMA. When considering the
weight of a child's preference, the court must take into account the
maturity of the child, ° the basis for the child's preference, 2' and
other factors that might affect or influence that preference.2 2 The
trial court may find, after consideration of all the evidence, that the
child's stated preference is not in his or her best interest.23
Thus, the statutory mandate and the directive of prior case law
address the appropriateness of considering the custodial preference
of minors. The remaining question, how evidence of custodial
preference should be presented, has not been examined and is the
subject of this Article.
III. PRESENTATION OF CUSTODIAL PREFERENCE EVIDENCE
There are three primary methods for introducing evidence of a
child's preference: (1) through direct testimony by the child in
open court; (2) through the testimony of third persons; or (3)
through an in camera interview of the child. Each method in-
troduces variables into the calculus that the court employs to reach
its custody decision. These variables may have both positive and
negative influences on that decision. Consequently, the court must
consider these potential influences when determining how, or if,
evidence of custodial preference should be presented.
1984) (stating that preferences of a mature child are to be given serious weight in custody
decisions).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(a)(2) (1989).
20. In re Marriage of Leff, 499 N.E.2d 1042, 1054 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1986), ap-
peal denied, 505 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. 1987) (Table No. 64473); In re Marriage of Lovejoy, 404
N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980).
21. In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 987 (Il. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988) (noting that
children's preference was based upon their desire to stay together and their belief that
they would not receive treatment equal to that received by the natural children of their
potential custodians); Siegel, 463 N.E.2d at 780 (explaining that the children's preference
was based upon a desire to remain with friends, stay in the same school and environment,
as well as a fear about how they would interact with new step-siblings). But see In re
Custody of Krause, 444 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982) (rejecting child's
preference based upon a desire to stay with current friends and the fact that the child felt
more comfortable with his stepfather than his natural father).
22. Leff, 499 N.E.2d at 1054 (holding that a child's preference based on fear and guilt
was properly rejected by the trial court); In re Marriage of Allen, 401 N.E.2d 608. 61!
(Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980) (rejecting the child's stated prtfzr .w for non-custodial
parent on grounds that preferenoe - ased only on fact that custodial parent was re-
snoncih f ;- ,iiid-s schooling and day-to-day discipline).
23. Schoff v. Schoff, 534 N.E.2d 462, 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1989); In re Mar-
riage of Jones, 513 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1987).
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A. Direct Testimony by the Child in Open Court
The direct testimony method of offering the child's preference,
though simple, is fraught with difficulties. Under this method, the
court hears direct testimony by the child, under oath, in open
court. Obviously, in a contested case, this testimony places the
child in an adversarial position with respect to one of his or her
parents. It also places the child, who is often of tender years and
enduring possibly the first emotional crisis of her life, in a situation
where the child must hurt one or both of her parents while they are
present. Additionally, the child is subject to the agonies of cross-
examination by opposing counsel.
Direct testimony by the child also lends itself to fears or allega-
tions of undue influence, false promises, or other coercive conduct
by the parent who calls the child as a witness. This problem is
particularly acute if that parent has physical possession or tempo-
rary custody of the child during the pendency of the proceeding.
Another negative aspect of in-court testimony by the child is that it
allows counsel to lead, confuse, or put words into the mouth of a
child witness.24 This is a problem especially when the child speaks
exclusively, or almost exclusively, to only one party's attorney.
Despite the shortcomings of the direct testimony method, cases
both prior to and after the adoption of the IMDMA allow in-court
testimony by the child. For example, in Crownover v. Crownover,25
a party attempted to offer the testimony of an eleven-year-old child
but the trial court declined to hear it. The appellate court reversed
and held that "while there is no absolute right to present the testi-
mony of a child in a custody proceeding, the trial court should not
summarily refuse to hear such witnesses. ' 26 The Crownover court
did not decide how the evidence of the child's preference should be
offered; instead, the court left the choice of the preferred method to
the trial court's discretion, allowing that court to ascertain the
24. One author observed:
In addition to the obvious problems ... concerning a child's ability to under-
stand what is being said and to communicate to others,.a final major problem
concerning language and the questioning of children is that of suggestibility. As
Professor Loftus writes, in noting that the form of a question may significantly
affect a child's answer: "The child as a witness, has always been regarded as not
only particularly inaccurate but also highly suggestible. This view has been
fairly widespread: 'Create, if you will, an idea of what the child is to see or
hear, and the child is very likely to hear or see what you desire.' "
Jones, supra note 1, at 64 (quoting ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 160
(1979) (quoting M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1926))).
25. 337 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1975).
26. Id. at 59-60.
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child's preference from the witness stand, in chambers, or both."
Further, in In re Marriage of Combs,28 the trial court refused to
allow a child to answer a question about her custodial preference.
The appellate court reversed, holding that "if competent as a wit-
ness in other respects, the child may testify to his custodial
preferences." '29
These cases illustrate that Illinois law gives the trial court discre-
tion to hear the custodial preference testimony of competent child
witnesses. However, the discretion may extend only to the method
of offering the child's preference. One can argue that if no in cam-
era interview is granted, the court may have an obligation to hear
offered, in-court testimony regarding the custodial preference of a
competent child witness.
B. Testimony of Third Persons
The court also may hear evidence of the child's preferences
through the testimony of third persons. This evidence usually is
admissible as an extension of the "state of mind" exception to the
hearsay rule. 30 The reliability of this evidence depends upon many
factors, including: (1) the relationship between the person testify-
ing and the party presenting the testimony; (2) the child's mental
state at the time of the alleged statement; (3) the context of the
conversation between the child and the third party; and (4) any
pressures or desires to please that the minor was under at the time
of the alleged statement. Illinois cases have allowed third-party
testimony by one or both parents,3 by neighbors,32 by relatives,33
by several witnesses,34 and by the introduction of a letter written
27. Id.
28. 397 N.E.2d 255, 256 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979).
29. Id. at 257 (citing Crownover, 337 N.E.2d at 59, and Patton v. Armstrong, 307
N.E.2d 178 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1974)).
30. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gustafson, 543 N.E.2d 575, 576-77 (I11. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1989); Quick v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins., 250 N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1969) (citing Mutual. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295
(1892)). For a thorough discussion of the "state of mind" exception to the Illinois rule
against hearsay, see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY AND GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 801.5, at 577-78 (5th ed. 1986).
31. In re Marriage of Slavenas, 487 N.E.2d 739, 740-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985);
In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
32. People ex. rel. Bukovic v. Smith, 423 N.E.2d 1302, 1306-07 (Ill A p. Cj. ist
Dist. 1981).
33. 54-1 N.E.2d at 576-77.
34. Stuckert v. Brownlee, 486 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985) (noting
that five witnesses testified about the child's preference for the father).
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by the child who was the subject of the custody proceeding.35
In In re Marriage of Rizzo,3 6 the First District Illinois Appellate
Court set forth the rationale for admission of this form of evidence:
One of the factors a court is to consider in determining custody
is the wishes of the children concerning with whom they desire to
live. Thus, one of the ultimate questions the court must deter-
mine is the wishes, or state of mind, of the children concerning
custody. This being the case, the statements by the children
made to [a neighbor] shortly before trial expressing their then
existing state of mind, though hearsay, were admissible if made
under conditions assuring trustworthiness.37
The Rizzo court held that the failure of the trial court to allow a
neighbor to testify concerning statements of preference by the chil-
dren was error a.3  The error, however, was harmless because the
trial court, in an effort to elicit the wishes of the children, con-
ducted an "extensive in camera examination . . .which served as
the functional equivalent of the third party's testimony. '39
The court in In re Marriage of Siegel 4 followed Rizzo and held
that it was harmless error to refuse to hear certain third-party testi-
mony regarding custodial preference when a full in camera inter-
view had taken place.4' The holdings of these cases seem to
express an implicit preference for the in camera interview over
third-party testimony. One explanation for this potential prefer-
ence is that courts view the in camera interview as a more trust-
worthy mechanism for making a judicial determination of
preference.
The testimony of experts, either retained by the parties or ap-
pointed by the court,42 perhaps provides a more credible form of
third-party evidence of the minor's preference. The expert's testi-
mony may include statements or actions by the child during the
expert's examination or testing that manifest the child's custodial
preference. The expert's testimony is subject to some of the same
credibility issues as other third-party testimony. However, in the
ideal situation, the hearsay problems are lessened because the
child's custodial preference is elicited by an objective person who
35. In re Marriage of McKeever, 453 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1983).
36. 420 N.E.2d 555 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1981).
37. Id. at 560 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(a)(2) (1979)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 463 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984).
41. Id. at 779.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 604(b) (1989).
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has some training in determining the truthfulness and the emo-
tional and mental status of the child.
Illinois trial courts have considerable discretion in allowing the
testimony of experts. However, the testimony of experts is not de-
terminative of the issue of custody.43 Recent cases indicate the
continued validity of this trial court discretion and the appropriate-
ness of expert testimony regarding the custodial preference of mi-
nors.4  For example, in In re Marriage of Sieck,45 the court
allowed a psychologist to recreate a conversation he had with a
friend of the father.4 6
Similarly, In re Marriage of Siegel4 7 involved a registered
clinical psychologist who testified for the father. The expert was
allowed to give his opinion as to the normalcy and maturity of the
children and to testify as to the children's preference and the rea-
sons for their preference. 4  After custody was granted to the
mother, the father appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in
not allowing the expert to give his opinion concerning which par-
ent should be awarded custody.49
The First District Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the custody
award, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to con-
sider the expert's opinion on the ultimate issue." The court found
that the trial court appropriately considered the psychologist's tes-
timony regarding the children's expressed wishes, even though
those wishes were not reflected in the ultimate decision of the
court. 51
43. See id. ("The court may seek the advice of professional personnel, whether or not
employed by the court on a regular basis." (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Bailey,
474 N.E.2d 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by disregarding the advice of professionals in a child custody case).
44. In re Marriage of Dunn, 567 N.E.2d 763, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1991) ("In
custody modification proceedings, the examining psychologist's testimony is entitled to
great weight."); In re Marriage of Seymour, 565 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1990) (affirming trial court's grant of custody to mother when no bias was reflected in
counselor's discussions with child).
45. 396 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
46. Id. at 1224. The psychologist testified that the child had expressed a preference
for the father in a conversation with the father's friend. Id.; see also In re Marriage of
Padiak, 427 N.E.2d 1372 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1981) (affirming the trial court's decision
not to conduct an in camera interview when a clinical psychologist had testified that the
minor had been tutored regarding what to say).
47. 463 N.E.2d 773, 776 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 778.
50. Id. at 779.
51. Id.
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C. In Camera Interviews of Children
The most credible and appropriate method of determining the
preference of a child is the in camera interview provided for in
section 604 of the IMDMA.5 2 Section 604(a) codifies prior Illinois
case law concerning judicial interviews of children, 53 but also adds
two important procedural safeguards to the previous procedure.
First, the parties have an absolute right to have counsel present
during the interview." This right can be waived only by the agree-
ment of both parties." The second safeguard mandates that a
court reporter be present to make a full and complete record of the
in camera interview.5 6 This requirement cannot be waived by the
parties.57
The parties have no absolute right to an in camera interview. 58
This construction of the IMDMA is consistent with prior Illinois
case law holding that there is no absolute right to present testi-
mony by a minor and that the court may decide not only whether,
but in what form, such testimony may be received in a particular
case. 59
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 604 (1989).
53. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 604 historical note (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Section
604 "codifies certain aspects of prior Illinois decisional law regarding judicial interviews
of children in child custody and visitation proceedings."). This section of the Illinois Act
was derived from § 404 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 404, 9A U.L.A. 600 (1987).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 604(a) (1989) ("Counsel shall be present at the
[judicial] interview [of the child] unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties." (emphasis
added)).
55. Id.; see DeYoung v. DeYoung, 379 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1978).
This requirement may create a problem if one party appears pro se. In that event, it may
be necessary to allow the unrepresented party to be present, which would clearly under-
mine the principal benefits of an in camera interview. In this situation, if both parties do
not agree to waive their presence at the interview, the trial judge should consider the
parent's presence when exercising his or her discretion to allow the interview.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 604(a) (1989) ("The court shall cause a court re-
porter to be present [at the judicial interview of the child] who shall make a complete
record of the interview instantaneously to be part of the record in the case." (emphasis
added)).
57. DeYoung, 379 N.E.2d at 399 (holding that the § 604(a) language-"court shall
cause a court reporter to be present"-does not authorize a waiver by the parties). But
see In re Marriage of Slavenas, 487 N.E.2d 739, 741-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985)
(holding that failure to provide a record of the in camera interview was harmless error
when the record of the entire proceeding provided appropriate information for review of
the trial court's decision).
58. In re Marriage of Milovich, 434 N.E.2d 811, 822-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982);
In re Marriage of Padiak, 427 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1981).
59. Stuckert v. Brownlee, 486 N.E.2d 395, 396-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985) (trial
judge's refusal to interview eleven-year-old was not an abuse of discretion since judge
"considered the child's... wishes through other evidence by allowing hearsay evidence
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Although the trial judge's decision to interview is discretionary,
appellate cases addressing alleged abuse of that discretion scruti-
nize three basic criteria. First, the appellate courts require that the
child at issue be of an age and maturity such that his or her prefer-
ence is entitled to consideration.' Second, reviewing courts refuse
to find an abuse of discretion when other evidence of custodial
preference was heard and considered. 6' Finally, when there was
some evidence that improper influence was, or might have been,
exerted on the minor, appellate courts uphold trial court decisions
refusing interviews.62 Usually, more than one of these factors is
present in appellate cases upholding a trial court's refusal to grant
an interview. 63 Also, a party cannot successfully complain about a
failure to interview when neither party has requested an
interview.64
Once the trial judge decides to conduct an in camera interview,
the scope of that interview is also discretionary. In Fohr v. Fohr,6
the issue concerned the scope of the trial judge's questioning of the
minor children. In particular, the mother argued that the court
through five witnesses who testified about [the child's] preference to remain with her
father"); In re Marriage of McKeever, 453 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist.
1983) (considering letter written by child expressing preference instead of in person testi-
mony); In re Marriage of Smith, 448 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983) (find-
ing no error when trial judge gave weight to child's preference presented through court-
appointed guardian ad litem); In re Marriage of Theeke, 433 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1981) (reaffirming the court's discretion to hear child custodial preference
testimony); Padiak, 427 N.E.2d at 1379-80 (finding refusal to grant child's testimony not
erroneous as other evidence in record indicated the best interests of the child regarding
custody).
60. McKeever, 453 N.E.2d at 1156 (finding no abuse of discretion when the trial judge
refused to interview a six-year-old regarding his custodial preference); Padiak, 427
N.E.2d at 1379 (stating that a seven-year-old was not sufficiently mature to express a
preference); People ex reL Bukovic v. Smith, 423 N.E.2d 1302, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1981) (holding that an interview as to preference would not have been "fruitful"
since the children were six- and three-years-old); Thomas v. Thomas, 372 N.E.2d 679,
680-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1978).
61. McKeever, 453 N.E.2d at 1156 (letter expressing child's preference was consid-
ered by the court); Padiak, 427 N.E.2d at 1379.
62. Stuckert, 486 N.E.2d at 396-97 (trial judge's reluctance to grant interview on
belief "that a child naturally would be swayed by adult pressure" was not erroneous as
judge did consider preference evidence presented by five other witnesses); Bukovic, 423
N.E.2d at 1309 (finding that the trial court did not err in declining to interview the
children when "there was sufficient doubt raised by evidence as to the influence exerted
on the boys by their grandfather").
63. See, e.g., Stuckert, 486 N.E.2d at 396-97.
64. In re Marriage of Sieck, 396 N.E.2d 1214. 1224 (Til App. C.. D,,,. ig/y)
(notino that "n ... g . oil or request was made by either party to the effect that such an
interview would have been necessary, or even helpful").
65. 394 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1979).
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exceeded the proper scope of the interview by failing to limit its
questions to those narrowly designed to elicit "the child's wishes as
to his custodian. "66 The appellate court rejected this argument,
observing that no objection to the interview procedure was made at
the time of the trial.67 The Fohr court further stated:
[T]he statutory admonition to the court to conduct the interview
"to ascertain the child's wishes as to his custodian and as to visi-
tation" necessarily clothes the court with considerable discretion
in setting the subject-matter limitations of the inquiry. Factual
situations are bound to vary widely as will the personalities of the
children being interviewed. Basic to an intelligent election by a
child would be an understanding of the necessity, background
and basis for the decision. Before a judge can properly weigh an
election he must satisfy himself that the child is making it while
possessed of the understanding that his age, intelligence, knowl-
edge and experience will permit him to assimilate. The court's
obligation to determine such factors operates to expand the scope
of the court's inquiry.68
At least two other Illinois courts have commented on the scope
of section 604 interviews. The trial court in In re Marriage of
Milovich allowed questions regarding the meaning of telling the
truth, the interrelationship between the siblings, the activities the
children engaged in with each parent, the help the children re-
ceived from each parent with school work, the discipline the chil-
dren received from each parent, and any instructions about what to
tell the court the children received from either parent.69 The ap-
pellate court concluded that the scope of the interview was appro-
priate and that the trial court may determine the custodial
preference based upon the children's "answers to other questions,
their personality, and other circumstances. ' 70
Moreover, in In re Marriage of Ford, the scope of questioning
included questions about school, friends, health, age, hobbies, fa-
vorite activities, the differences between right and wrong, and con-
cluded with the question "[w]hat do you think we ought to do here
today?"7 As in Milovich, the Ford court held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion because the proper scope of in camera
interviews is not confined to questions regarding with whom the
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 90.
69. 434 N.E.2d 811, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1982).
70. Id. at 823.
71. 415 N.E.2d 546, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980).
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child wants to live and "what visitation he would desire. 7 2
The in camera interview is not without its detractions. In cam-
era interviews suffer from the same problems inherent in the other
methods of presenting the child's custodial preference. A parent,
relative, or friend still may attempt to influence the child's asserted
preference.73 The child may have been told what to say or what
not to say 74 or the child may attempt to play one parent against the
other during the pendency of the case to gain some perceived ad-
vantage. Moreover, the judge may feel uncomfortable or inade-
quate in his or her ability to communicate easily with children.
Finally, some believe that it is never appropriate to ask a child to
make a choice between parents or to have a child believe that a
custody decision will be based upon his or her preference. While
this problem is inherent in all of the potential methods of offering a
child's custodial preference, it is especially acute in the interview
setting, where the judge sits as the inquisitor as well as the trier of
fact.75
Although the in camera interview is subject to these problems, it
nevertheless provides the most effective method for a trial court to
discover the child's actual preference. The child discloses his or
her custodial preference in the least threatening environment.
Through skillful questioning and careful observation, the judge can
determine factors vital to a proper determination of custody.
72. Id.
73. See In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1988).
74. See In re Marriage of Eleopoulis, 542 N.E.2d 505, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1989) (holding that evidence that the child was beaten discredited her testimony that she
wanted to live with her father).
75. This last objection was a major issue in In re Marriage of Gustafson, 543 N.E.2d
575 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989). The trial court in Gustafson refused to interview the
twelve- and seven-year-old children of the parties. Id. at 578. The trial court stated its
reasoning as follows:
The evidence as I understand it is closed. With respect to interviewing the
children, I don't like to put the children in a position where they feel there is
pressure put upon them. That they are making a decision where they're put in a
position where they can be pressured by an adult and then have to worry about
what adults are going to think about what they said in there, where they think
they are responsible for the decision. I don't think that what they contribute
would be substantial compared to the drawbacks that would result from the
pressure put on them in that situation. They've got to go on living with all of
those people so I exercise my discretion and decline to interview the children.
Id. The appellate court reversed and remanded holding that "[t]he trial cmrt' -
ing would be an argument for alway r :g t, CAamine children in custody disputes.
The ps!-*i , is contrary to respected authority and ignores the elements to consider when
deciding the propriety of having children testify." Id. at 578-79.
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These factors are not readily apparent from the traditional in-court
methods of determining custodial preference.
For instance, a judge acting as a questioner, and not merely as
an observer, can get a sense of the maturity of the minor and the
voluntariness of the minor's statements. The inquiring judge can
ask for the reasoning behind the child's statement of preference,
can inquire into any inappropriate behavior of the parents, and can
question the child about the strength or depth of his or her prefer-
ence. Finally, the child will have a sense of being a part of a deci-
sion affecting his or her life and will have a chance to say anything
he or she wants outside the presence of parents.
These benefits, of course, come about only if the judge feels, or at
least appears to feel, comfortable with the minor, and if the judge
can make the minor comfortable enough to communicate freely.
Although guidelines for in camera interview techniques are avail-
able,76 each judge must plan and conduct the interview based on
his or her background, his or her ability to communicate with chil-
dren, and the facts of the individual case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Illinois law provides lawyers and judges with several means
through which the preference of minors appropriately may be de-
termined and considered in custody determinations. This author
favors the in camera interview as the most flexible, reliable, and
appropriate method of making this difficult factual determination.
As another commentator stated:
The interview should be considered a critical element in the cus-
tody determination process. A child of sufficient age and intelli-
gence can make his own choice; he need not be a mental giant to
know where he wants to be and with whom. Obviously, the mat-
ter should be an appropriate factor in awarding Custody. In an
appropriate case, it can be controlling. It is as sound a basis
upon which to decide the issue of custody as any. Nothing less
than the child's future happiness and welfare are at stake. His
choice, his wishes, are terribly meaningful if those goals are to be
achieved."
Whether the judge conducts an interview and whatever the
76. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 72-91 (providing a proposed model of considera-
tions a judge may employ when conducting an in camera interview in a custody action).
For an excellent guideline used by Illinois judges, see Judge Susan Snow, Conducting A
Child/Judicial Interview: An Outline for Sensitivity and Success, in ILLINOIS JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE-REGIONAL SEMINAR BINDER-CHILDREN IN THE LAW § 5, Al (1991).
77. Speca, supra note 9, at 457.
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scope of the interview, lawyers should ask the court to hear some
evidence of a child's wishes in each case in which preference might
be an issue. Courts must exercise discretion regarding what types
of evidence will be heard. Given the wording of the IMDMA,
courts should consider evidence of preference in custody cases and,
in this regard, may even allow more than one form of evidence. If
no evidence of custodial preference is heard, the court should state
specifically the reasons supporting its ruling. The judge should
consider granting an in camera interview to lessen the impact on
the minor. Thoughtful consideration of how and when to consider
evidence of child custodial preference can promote custody deci-
sions that truly will be "in the best interest of the child."
